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INTRODUCTION TO MORTGAGE LENDING
DISCRIMINATION LAW
ROBERT

G. SCHWEMM*

INTRODUCTION

In this Symposium are people from all over the country who
have widely differing levels of experience with lending discrimination cases; many of these authors have litigated many of these
cases. Many of these authors are nationally prominent speakers
on this subject. I would like to present a broad overview of where
we are in this field today and how we got there, along with some
basic ideas about what goes into proving a lending discrimination
case, in order to provide some background for the outstanding
authors who will follow me.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN LENDING DISCRIMINATION

Mortgage lending discrimination is one of the principal civil
rights issues facing the country today. It was not always so. In
fact, much of the awareness of this problem and most of the litigation directed against it have occurred only recently. One of the
nice things about this situation for a Symposium like this is that
even people who are not too experienced in this field can become
quite well-versed in a short period of time.
A. The 1968-1988 Period
The basic law that prohibits discrimination in housing finance has been on the books since 1968. That is the federal Fair
Housing Act (FHA), also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.1 The Fair Housing Act was produced in the wake of
the urban riots of 1967, which in turn produced the Kerner Commission Report.2 The Kerner Commission's analysis of the racial
divisions in America included a good deal of material on the formation and maintenance of racial ghettos and residential segrega-

* Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law;
B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1992).
2.

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REP. OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY

COMM'N ON CIV. DISORDERS (1968). For a description of this Report's relevance to
the enactment and interpretation of the Fair Housing Act, see Laufman v. Oakley
Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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tion, and listed among its housing recommendations 3an expanded
program of low-interest loans for lower income areas.
Since 1968, there have been a number of noteworthy events
in this field, but only a few reported cases. Most of these cases
have occurred in recent years, some two decades after passage of
the Fair Housing Act. In other words, the FHA did not instantly
produce a body of mortgage lending discrimination cases, as it did,
say, in the sales and rental areas. Why there was such a dearth of
lending cases in the early years of the Fair Housing Act is an
interesting question. It seems likely that there was at least as
much discrimination by home loan institutions then as there is
today, but, whatever the level of discrimination, it was rarely
challenged in court.4
In 1974, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA),5 which bans discrimination in all types of credit
transactions, including home mortgages. Originally, the ECOA
outlawed only sex and marital status discrimination, but in 1976,
it was amended to cover race, color, religion, and a number of
other bases of discrimination.6 So, by 1976, there were two sepa-

3. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON Civ. DISORDERS, supra note 2, at ch. 6 ("The
Formation of Racial Ghettos") and 475-77 (low-interest loan program). In an early
mortgage discrimination case, the court took note of the Commission's material on
ghetto formation and concluded that:
[Tihe imposition of barriers to occupancy in the form of higher mortgageinterest rates or refusals to make loans in connection with housing in changing neighborhoods works to discourage families, white or black, which could
afford to purchase homes in such neighborhoods. The practical effect is to
discourage whites - who may freely move elsewhere - from moving into
vacancies in "changing" neighborhoods, thereby inducing "massive transition" and, ultimately, "white flight."
Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 496-97.
4. As an aside, I might note that almost all of the mortgage lending cases reported in the first two decades after the Fair Housing Act took effect were brought
either in the greater Chicago metropolitan area or in the state of Ohio. See infra
notes 9, 43 for a number of cases in these regions. See also Cartwright v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989); Watson v. Pathway Fin., 702 F.
Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas v. First Fed. Say. Bank of Ind., 653 F. Supp.
1330 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Evans v. First Fed. Say. Bank of Ind., 669 F. Supp. 915
(N.D. Ind. 1987); Harper v. Union Say. Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
The only plausible explanation that I can come up with for this phenomenon is
that the Chicago area and the state of Ohio boasted some of the more aggressive
private fair housing organizations in the country, and these organizations had the
interest, resources, and energy to bring lending discrimination cases when very few
others could do so.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(f) (1992).
6. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239,
90 Stat. 251 (1976). The ECOA's prohibited bases of discrimination are race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age (provided the applicant has the
capacity to contract), the fact that the applicant's income derives from public assistance programs, and the fact that the applicant has in good faith exercised any
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rate federal statutes in place that were available to challenge
mortgage discrimination.7
In 1975, Congress passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA).8 This law requires financial institutions to report certain data about their home loans, but it is not a nondiscrimination
law. You cannot sue under HMDA. And in 1975, it only required
reporting of home loan data by census tracts, which was not really
very helpful in determining whether a lending institution was
engaged in illegal discrimination.
Continuing chronologically, the first reported judicial decision
in this field was a case called Laufman v. Oakley Building &
Loan Co.,' which was decided in 1976, some eight years after
enactment of the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff in Laufman was
a white individual who bought a house in a racially diverse area
of Cincinnati and felt that the defendant did not provide equal
loans in that area. He brought what is called a "redlining" case.
That is, he claimed that he was discriminated against not because
of his race, but because of the racial make-up of the area where
he wanted to buy a house. The court upheld the theory of this
lawsuit by rejecting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. So, whites as well as blacks are permitted to make claims
under the Fair Housing Act if they allege racial discrimination
that has an impact on them.1"
A year after Laufman, a case was reported by the name of
United States v. A.I.R.E.A., 11 where the Justice Department accused the national appraisal organizations of encouraging the
practice of taking the racial make-up of neighborhoods into account in doing housing appraisals. In that era, appraisers thought
that properties should be appraised down if they were located in
racially mixed areas compared to all-white areas. Indeed, this
practice was a matter of the ethics of the appraisal industry appraisers could be sanctioned for not following it - for years
after enactment of the Fair Housing Act until the A.I.R.E.A. liti12
gation put an end to it.

right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1992).
7. State and local antidiscrimination laws may also prohibit mortgage discrimination.
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1992).
9. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
10. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979)
(holding that anyone may sue under Title VIII who is "genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone's . . . rights"); Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Say.
& Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Co.,
414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
11. 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1978).
12. The A.I.R.E.A. litigation was settled by a consent decree. See id. Thus, like
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One of the themes that I want to establish here is that the
passage of the Fair Housing Act by itself did not change things
automatically in the home mortgage field. Industries were used to
doing things a certain way, and they continued to behave in that
certain way. The appraisers fought the Justice Department lawsuit on the theory that the Fair Housing Act did not cover their
activities, but the court held that it did, and the appraisal industry began to change in 1977.
Also in 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA),' 3 which, like HMDA, does not support a private cause
of action, but rather, requires financial institutions to serve the
credit needs of the community in which they operate, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 4 The performance of a
financial institution as judged by the CRA standards can be important background information for those prosecuting a lending
discrimination case. 5
By 1980, a number of published academic studies, both nationwide and on a regional or metropolitan-wide basis, examined
whether race was a factor in the mortgage lending decisions of
financial institutions."6 Virtually all of these studies concluded
that it was. Some of the studies were criticized by professional
statisticians or economists on technical grounds, but there remained a general sense that the discriminatory lending problems
that the 1968 Fair Housing Act attempted to address were still
continuing.
Still, throughout most of the 1980s, only a few mortgage

the Lau[man case, it was not fully litigated all the way through to a decision on
the merits. Indeed, even up through today, there are only a handful of mortgage
lending cases that have been tried on the merits, and very few of these have been
won by plaintiffs. This means that much of the guidance to be gained from the
reported cases in this field is derived from decisions that have dealt with preliminary motions or have been settled with consent decrees.
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1992).

14. See id. § 2903.
15. "[Llending institutions are required to serve all communities of their service
area, and if their failure to comply is correlated with the race of the underserved
neighborhoods, intentional discrimination, in violation of the Fair Housing Act and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, can be inferred." Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Concerning Mortgage Lending
Discrimination,103d Cong., 1st Sess. 534 (1993) (statement of Acting Asst. Att'y
Gen. James P. Turner, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter DiscriminationHearings].
16. See, e.g., A. THOMAS KING, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING: A

STUDY OF THREE CITIES (Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd. Working Paper No. 91, 1980);
DAVID LISTOKIN & STEPHEN CASEY, MORTGAGE LENDING AND RACE (Rutgers Univ.
Ctr. for Urban Pol'y Research 1980); ROBERT SCHAFER & HELEN LADD, EQUAL
CREDIT OPPORTUNITY IN MORTGAGE LENDING (Joint Ctr. for Urban Studies 1980).

See generally George C. Galster, Research on Discriminationin Housing and Mortgage Markets, 3 Hous. POLY DEBATE 639 (1992).
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lending cases were brought. Very little was being done at this
time in the way of litigation or enforcement. More than two decades after Title VIII's enactment, the basic problem of mortgage
discrimination was not being addressed.
B. The Modern Era
Toward the end of the 1980s, the era that we are in today
began. The initial triggering mechanism was a series of newspaper articles written in 1988 by a reporter named Bill Dedman in
7 Dedman analyzed how the
the Atlanta Journal & Constitution."
Atlanta financial institutions were lending money and where they
were lending money. The gist of his articles was that the Atlanta
institutions were heavily investing in housing loans in white areas and avoiding areas that were heavily African-American.
Dedman's series had a tremendous effect, but again not immediately through litigation. The Atlanta financial institutions professed to be shocked to find out that this was happening, and a
number of them committed substantial funds to loan programs in
minority areas.
Then Congress became interested in this subject. All of a
sudden, the earlier studies that I mentioned, which were out there
gathering dust, were of interest to members of Congress. And laws
began to be passed again. Another wave of legislation occurred.
For example, in 1988, the Fair Housing Amendments Act
strengthened and broadened the provisions of the 1968 Fair Housing Act that prohibited lending discrimination. 18
An even more important event was the passage in 1989 of
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act. 9 This law, which basically tried to bolster the financial institutions in an era in which a number of savings and loans were
experiencing difficulties, also included a provision amending the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to require reporting of home loans
and applications "grouped according to census tract, income level,
racial characteristics, and gender."0 As a result, beginning in
1990, financial institutions subject to HMDA were required to file
annual reports of their home loan applications and their rejection
and acceptance rates by race as well as by census tract and the
other statutorily required factors.
Beginning in 1991, studies were published analyzing the

17. Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 1-16, 1988.
18. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(1988). In particular, the 1988 amendments broadened the coverage of the section
of the FHA that explicitly banned mortgage discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605
(1992).
19. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4).
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1990 HMDA data, which showed significant differences in the rejection rates of black and white applicants. For example, a nationwide study conducted by researchers for the Federal Reserve
Board found that about thirty-four percent of black applicants for
home mortgage credit were rejected versus about fourteen percent
of the white applicants.2"
Now, as the financial institutions are quick to point out, that
fact alone does not prove a case of discrimination. It doesn't prove
it as to any individual financial institution, because these are nationwide statistics. But even if one focuses on the statistics of an
individual lender, disparate rejection rates would not by themselves prove discrimination, because there could be other factors
that might explain that result. For example, a lending institution
might claim that it has special outreach programs for minorities,
which means that it attracts more minority applicants than white
applicants, with the result that its black applicants tend to have
more credit problems than do its white applicants. So, the fact
that this institution rejects a larger percentage of minorities than
whites does not by itself prove that it is applying discriminatory
standards. It could be applying exactly the same credit standards
across the board.
But these HMDA results were the kinds of statistics that at
least had to be explained. They called for some kind of response.
And one of the types of responses that occurred was that Congressional committees with oversight responsibility for the federal
agencies that regulate financial institutions began to ask these
agencies what they were doing to find out whether these statistics
did indeed reflect illegal discrimination. In addition, HUD, Fannie
Mae, and other interested groups began to hold major national
conferences on the subject of lending discrimination.
Then, in 1992, the Department of Justice concluded a yearlong investigation and brought the most significant case it had
ever instituted in this field, United States v. Decatur Federal Savings & Loan.22 Decatur Federal is an Atlanta institution; that
case grew directly out of the series of articles written by Bill
Dedman. The Justice Department looked at all of the Atlanta
financial institutions in light of the HMDA data and eventually
focused on Decatur Federal.
Now, if you are a small practitioner representing a single
individual or couple who think they have been discriminated
against in a home loan situation, you will find some good news
and some bad news in the DecaturFederal case. The good news is
that some of the areas that you might look into have already been
21. Glenn B. Canner & Delores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 859 (1991).
22. 2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,377 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
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demonstrated to be useful by the Justice Department's investigation. The bad news is that this case took a year and over a $1
million for the Justice Department to investigate. And even within that year, months and months went by before anyone in Justice
was confident that this would turn out to be a legitimate, provable
case. Accordingly, if your focus is a little more modest, and you
are unwilling to spend one million and a full year investigating
your first case, you might approach Decatur Federal as a source of
ideas rather than a model for your own litigation.
Nevertheless, Decatur Federal is a very significant case, because it captured the attention of the country with respect to this
problem. It showed how HMDA data could be used to help build a
case. And the terms of the consent decree 23 - it was settled almost immediately after being filed - are a model for what a financial institution can be asked to do to remedy past discrimination.
Also in 1992, the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston published
a significant study dealing with the HMDA data for financial
institutions in the Boston area.2 4 This study is important because it addressed the problem I mentioned earlier that HMDA
data does not necessarily prove discrimination because other, nonracial factors might be at play in lending decisions. The Boston
Fed study tried to eliminate all of these other variables, such as
the applicants' credit history and their debt load. Some fifty variables other than race were identified and eliminated. The result
was that, even without considering these other variables, the
disparities in rejection rates for minorities and whites remained
high.25 This has been a very controversial study, subject to both
attack and counter-attack on technical grounds.2" But the general sense that it has left is that the factors other than race do
not fully explain the disparities in rejection rates. Race remains a
key decision-making factor.
There were other studies that were published at this time.
Ralph Nader's group did one.2 His people focused primarily on
redlining as opposed to individual case studies. Using the HMDA

23. See id.
24. ALIcIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
THE HMDA DATA (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
25. The Boston Fed study found that the home loan rejection rates for blacks
and Hispanics were 56% higher than for whites in the Boston area, even when all
significant nonracial variables were held constant. Id.
26. See, e.g., JAMES H. CARR & ISAAC F. MEGBOLUGBE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF BOSTON STUDY ON MORTGAGE LENDING REVISITED (Fannie Mae Office of
Hous. Research Working Paper 1993).
27. JONATHAN BROWN, RACIAL REDLINING: A STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Essential Info., Inc.
1993).
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data, the Nader study identified sixteen cities where they found
institutions with discriminatory lending patterns. In the Chicago
area, for example, the study identified eight institutions that
appeared to be engaged in racial redlining. If you have an individual case, it might be worth your while to get this study and see
whether your defendant is on this list.
Earlier this year, most of the federal agencies that regulate
financial institutions joined together in a project called the Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending that produced a "Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending." 28 This statement was published in the Federal Register and provides a good deal of guidance as to what these agencies think mortgage discrimination is
and is not and what they will consider in investigating institutions for discrimination. This action indicates a degree of seriousness of purpose among these agencies that is quite different from
the attitudes of the 1970s and 1980s. These days, Washington
regulators want to be seen as taking the problem of mortgage
lending discrimination very seriously.
Also this year, a jury in Houston in a case called Simms v.
First Gibraltar Bank29 returned a $3.2 million verdict for the
plaintiffs in a private lending discrimination case. This is one of
the few lending cases in which plaintiffs have won a decision on
the merits in the entire history of the Fair Housing Act, and its
record-setting verdict is sure to draw additional attention to this
field.
To sum up, we have had laws on the books for more than a
quarter of a century that ban mortgage discrimination. Although
there was a flurry of related legislative activity and academic
studies during the 1970s, very little litigation occurred during this
time, apart from a few cases in isolated parts of the country. This
meant there was little guidance on how to prosecute a successful
case, and large portions of the country had no enforcement or litigation experience at all.
During this period, however, some basic principles of law
were being established, such as the difference between redlining
and individual cases.3 ° As we shall see in subsequent sections,
the 1970s and 1980s also produced precedents in related fields
that would ultimately come to be used in the mortgage lending
area. But it was not until the late 1980s that public attention and
the HMDA amendments set the stage for the period of accelerat-

28. See 59 Fed. Reg. 18, 266-74 (1994).
29. No. H-91-3367 (S.D. Tex. 1994), reported in Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
(P-H) 111.1 (May 1, 1994).
30. Although these claims are quite different analytically, both may be brought
in the same case. See, e.g., Cartwright v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d
912 (7th Cir. 1989).
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ing litigation that we find ourselves in today.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY ACT

This section provides an overview of the Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the two laws that are
available to challenge mortgage discrimination. Basically, in order
to make out a case under the Fair Housing Act, there must be
four elements present. First, the case must involve a property that
is covered by the statute. The Fair Housing Act covers only
"dwellings."3 Dwellings are homes to which people intend to return on a semi-permanent basis. Cases involving temporary residences have caused some difficulty with respect to this element,
but it is an easy one to satisfy in most home mortgage cases.
Second, the specific transaction must be covered. This is easy
in the lending area, too, because there is explicit language covering financial discrimination in the Fair Housing Act, 2 and there
is also general coverage in another portion of the Act that deals
with transactions that "otherwise make unavailable" housing,
which the courts have read to include mortgage discrimination.3 3
Third, there must be an illegal basis of discrimination. The
Fair Housing Act includes seven: race; color; religion; sex; national
origin; familial status; and handicap.34 If the plaintiff proves
that one of these illegal bases of discrimination was the reason for
a covered transaction being denied in a situation involving a
dwelling, then the plaintiff wins. If the plaintiff fails to prove this,
then the defendant wins, no matter how silly his real reason may
be. For example, if the lender proves that the lending officer had
just lost a lot of money on a football bet and, as a result, didn't
treat people appropriately, but the lending officer wasn't engaged
in racial discrimination (i.e., he was treating all applicants in the
same inferior way that day), then the defendant wins. It may be
bad behavior. Your client may be upset. Your client didn't get a
loan he should have gotten. But being upset and winning a discrimination case are two different thing. You lose on the allegation of discrimination. The only way for the plaintiff to win is if
the defendant's behavior is because of one of those seven illegal
bases.

31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-3606, 3617 (1992). The definition of "dwelling" is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
32. § 3605.
33. § 3604(a); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mort. Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 492-93
(S.D. Ohio 1976). See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION § 13.4(4) (1994).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617.
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Fourth is the standard of proof as to this "because" element,
that is, what must be shown in order to prove that the defendant's
behavior toward the plaintiff was indeed because of one of these
seven bases. There are many cases under the Fair Housing Act
that deal with this, although they usually involve rentals and
sales of housing rather than lending situations, but the principles
are the same. Basically, the plaintiff can satisfy this element by
proving intentional discrimination or by proving that the defendant was applying a policy that had an unjustified discriminatory
effect. This fourth element, which is the key to winning or losing
most mortgage discrimination cases, will be dealt with in greater
detail in Part IV.
So, from a substantive point of view, the Fair Housing Act is
not too difficult. Just establish these four elements. However, the
FHA can be very complicated from an enforcement point of view.
If your client has been aggrieved by a Fair Housing Act violation,
you have a number of forums to choose from, each with its own
different types of relief. This Article will not cover this subject,
but readers should at least be aware of the options that are
available.35
With respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the principal point I want to make has to do with the illegal bases of discrimination. All forms of credit are covered by the ECOA, including housing credit, so coverage there is no problem. However, the
statute does have a different set of illegal bases of discrimination
than the FHA. Both cover race, color, religion, national origin, and
sex. But familial status and handicap are not covered by ECOA,
so you would only be able to use the FHA for these types of cases.
On the other hand, ECOA has four additional bases that do not
appear in the Fair Housing Act; these are marital status, age,
having one's income derive from public assistance, and retaliation
36
for exercising rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
So, for example, if people are being discriminated against because
of their marital status, you could bring that under the ECOA, but
not under the Fair Housing Act.37
35. An aggrieved person under the FHA has essentially three enforcement op-

tions: (1) he can file an individual suit in court without waiting for an administrative process to be completed; (2) he can also file a claim with HUD and follow the
administrative route, in which case additional options are presented, including
having the case referred to a state or local civil rights agency or having it re-routed
to federal court; and (3) he can call the matter to the attention of the Justice Department if a pattern or practice of discrimination is involved. See generally
SCHWEMM, supra note 33, at chs. 24-26. In all of these situations, equitable relief is
available and the aggrieved person may be awarded actual damages; in some situations, punitive damages, limited civil penalties, and attorney's fees are also
available. Id.
36. See supra note 6 for a list of ECOA's prohibited bases of discrimination.
37. Also be aware that state and local antidiscrimination laws applicable to
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The Equal Credit Opportunity Act has its own enforcement
and relief provisions.3" You do not follow the Fair Housing Act
provisions with an ECOA claim. In a race or national origin case,
you may very well decide to bring a two-count complaint in federal court under both of these laws, but as a general matter, you do
have to keep in mind the differences between these laws in terms
of forums and relief available.
III. EXAMPLES OF ILLEGAL MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION

What form does mortgage lending discrimination take? Here
are some examples that are taken from the Policy Statement on
Discrimination in Lending that was issued by the federal Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending earlier this year:
(1) Failing to provide information or services or providing
different information or services regarding any aspect of the lending process, including credit availability, application procedures,
or lending standards;
(2) Discouraging or selectively encouraging applicants with
respect to inquiries about or applications for credit;
(3) Refusing to extend credit or using different standards in
determining whether to extend credit;
(4) Varying the terms of credit offered, including the amount,
interest rate, duration, or type of loan;
(5) Using different standards to evaluate collateral; and
(6) Treating a borrower differently in servicing a loan or invoking default remedies.39
It is clear from these examples that discrimination may take
many forms in addition to an outright refusal to extend credit. An
outright refusal is certainly one type of potential violation, but
there are also many others. For example, discrimination could
take the form of a difference in the terms and conditions of a loan,
such as asking a minority applicant to make a greater down payment or to pay higher interest rates.
Even a difference in the level of encouragement or information supplied may be a violation. In the Decatur Federal case, for
example, the Justice Department found that in comparing the
treatment accorded black and white applicants, virtually all of the
qualified applicants -

black as well as white -

were approved by

Decatur Federal. Similarly, applicants of both races with poor
credit were turned down. There was little or no discrimination as
to either of these groups. However, where the Justice Department

mortgage lending may have a list of prohibited bases of discrimination that is
different from either the FHA or the ECOA.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1992).
39. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,268 (1994).
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found a substantial amount of discrimination was in the case of
marginally qualified applicants.40 Someone would come in and
just barely miss qualifying for a loan, because, for example, he
had too much credit card debt. What often would happen then is
that a white loan officer, seeing this situation with a white applicant, would suggest that the applicant pay down some of his credit card debt, which would then allow his home loan to be approved. But the loan officer was not giving this advice to similarly
qualified black applicants. This difference in treatment may even
have been subconscious on the part of the loan officers, but that is
irrelevant. There was a clear pattern of discrimination.
So, do not think you are just looking for outright turndowns
or blatant forms of different terms and conditions. A variety of
other situations might be illegal as well.
IV. PROVING ILLEGAL MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION
Next, I would like to lay out how one goes about proving that
a particular transaction - to keep it simple, I will use an outright
rejection of a home loan - was based on race or some other illegal
factor as opposed to one of the myriad nonillegal factors that a
defendant may claim it was based on. In this regard, the basic
law under the Fair Housing Act is the same as it is under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
A. Intent Cases

In most of these cases, the plaintiff will be attempting to
prove intentional discrimination. Intentional discrimination may
be shown in two ways. The first is by direct evidence. For example, a witness comes forward who says that he was in the conference room when loan applications were being discussed and the
person in charge said, "I don't think we ought to approve this loan
because it's in a black neighborhood." This would be discouraging
from the point of view of the goals of the antidiscrimination laws,
but it would be absolutely wonderful from the point of view of
someone having to prosecute the case. If you ever find that kind of
witness, you are a lucky litigator.
But this rarely happens. Defendants are more sophisticated
now. They just don't talk in these terms much anymore. So, it's
rare that you are going to get that kind of direct evidence.
The more typical situation is that you are going to have to
prove intent by what has come to be called the "prima facie case"
method." In order to do this, the plaintiff initially must estab40. See DiscriminationHearings,supra note 15, at 535-36.

41. The law on this subject is derived from Supreme Court decisions in the
employment discrimination field under Title VII, such as St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
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lished a few basic elements. For example, in a case where the
claim is that the plaintiff was turned down because of his race, a
prima facie case will be made out if the plaintiff proves that: (1)
he is a member of a minority race; (2) he applied for a home loan
from the defendant; (3) the defendant rejected the plaintiff, knowing of the plaintiffs race; and (4) the defendant approved loans for
white applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff's. 42 In
a redlining case, the list of factors is somewhat different because
the focus in this type of case is on the race of the neighborhood
rather than on the race of the applicant.'
Once the plaintiff has established these elements, he has
shown enough to win if the defendant does nothing. It's like a
tennis match; the ball is now in the defendant's court. But, of
course, the defendant always has a response. He is going to try to
meet his burden of rebuttal by articulating some nonillegal reason, such as the lending officer was too concerned with his bad
football bet that day or the plaintiff has too much credit card debt.
Now the ball is back in the plaintiffs court. In virtually all of
these cases, the ultimate result boils down to whether the plaintiff
can rebut the defendant's articulated reason and show that the
particular excuse is a pretext for discrimination because it was
not applied to similarly situated white applicants.
In the traditional fair housing case, this proof is often supplied by testing. If a black person is rejected for an apartment
allegedly because he has a pet, this excuse can be shown to be a
pretext if the defendant is willing to rent to a white tester who
has a pet.
But testing in the mortgage lending field is fairly new." It
has not been done much, at least until quite recently. It is more
difficult than traditional rental testing, and there may even be
legal constraints that prevent a tester from signing an application

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Texas Dept. of Community Aft. v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a
discussion of how the principles of these cases have been applied to fair housing
claims, see SCHWEMM, supra note 33, at § 10.2.
42. See, e.g., Hickson v. Home Fed. of Atlanta, 805 F. Supp. 1567, 1571-72 (N.D.

Ga. 1992); Watson v. Pathway Fin., 702 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas
v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Indiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

43. The factors in a redlining case include: (1) the house is in a minority
neighborhood; (2) the plaintiff applied for a loan from the defendant; (3) the appraisal showed that the house's value equaled its price; (4) the plaintiff was
creditworthy; and (5) the defendant rejected the plaintiffs application. See, e.g.,
Steptoe v. Savings of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542, 1546 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Old West
End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
44. See generally George C. Galster, Use of Testers in Investigating DiscriminaCLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE:
MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA, ch. 7 (Michael Fix & Raymond J.

tion in Mortgage Lending and Insurance, in
Struyk eds., Urban Inst. Press 1992).
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for a mortgage using false information. Some mortgage testing is
now being done, particularly at the initial in-take stage. The National Fair Housing Alliance is in the process of doing a major
study involving testing in this area. The Justice Department is
beginning to do mortgage testing. We are on the threshold of
finding out whether testing can be effectively used in these cases.
If it can be, it has the potential to provide very dramatic and
effective evidence of discrimination.
In the absence of testing, however, the key will be to find
similarly situated white applicants who were treated more favorably than the minority plaintiff. This can be a difficult task. It
will usually require a detailed examination of the defendant's loan
files. The Justice Department was able to gain access to these
files in the Decatur Federal case as part of its pre-complaint investigation, but private plaintiffs may not have this kind of leverage and may have to wait until formal discovery after filing their
complaint.
While the key to proving an individual case is comparing the
treatment accorded specific black and white applicants, there are
other sources of evidence that may be used to establish intentional discrimination inferentially. As mentioned earlier, one source is
the basic HMDA data for the particular institution, which would
show whether its rejection rate of minority applicants was much
higher than its rejection rate of whites. Another idea mentioned
above is checking how a potential defendant has defined its effective service area under the Community Reinvestment Act and
then determining whether the boundaries of its lending activity
correlate with racial residential patterns.
In addition, the Justice Department in Decatur Federal
looked at the defendant's marketing and advertising practices and
found evidence of discrimination there. For example, Decatur
Federal did not advertise in the Atlanta media that focused on the
black community. In terms of marketing, the loan officers were
encouraged to contact certain types of people, like up-scale realtors and appraisers, to spread the word about their loan products,
and these contacts turned out to be almost exclusively in white
communities. In addition, Decatur Federal had more than forty
branch offices, and it placed virtually all of these in white areas;
indeed, the only one45that served a black area was being closed at
the time of the suit.

45. Another practical advantage that the Justice Department had in litigating
the DecaturFederal case was that the defendant there was about to be taken over
by another financial institution, which made it anxious to avoid being the target in
a long, drawn-out discrimination case prosecuted by the federal government. This
may have had some influence on its willingness to agree to an early settlement
that provided for $1 million to the identified discrimination victims and a series of
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It might also be worth noting whether the defendant's loan
officers are all or virtually all white persons. And whether the
appraisers who are being used are always white. As mentioned
earlier, much of the discrimination that may be going on can be
explained simply by the fact that white employees feel more comfortable giving a little extra service to those applicants of their
own race.
B. Effect Cases

In addition to this type of basic intent case, both the Fair
Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act may be violated if the defendant has a practice that disproportionately burdens
protected class members and there is not a good business reason
justifying that practice.4" These are called "disparate impact" or
"discriminatory effect" cases.
In these cases, the plaintiff must identify a lending practice
that has a disproportionate impact on minorities. For example,
one practice may be a mortgage company's policy against making
loans under a certain dollar amount, such as $60,000. Statistical
evidence is the key to proving disparate impact. You find out what
percentage of minority individuals are excluded by that policy
versus what percentages of whites are excluded; if the former is
significantly higher than the latter, then the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
Now, what is the defendant's burden of rebuttal in a disparate impact case? The law on this subject in lending cases is not
yet firmly established.4" It is still being worked out. In any
event, it is a tough burden for the defendant to satisfy. The defendant basically has to show that there is a necessary business

dramatic changes in its marketing, hiring, and training practices. Other financial
institutions that are in the process of seeking regulatory approval for a take-over,
merger, or some similar development may also be inclined to negotiate a settlement, even with a private plaintiff, that includes reform-type equitable relief as
well as monetary damages.
46. In establishing this proposition, the lower courts have again applied the
Supreme Court's decisions under Title VII, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), and its progeny, to fair housing cases. As to the FHA, see Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-37 (2d Cir.), affd per
curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 33, § 10.4(1). As to
the ECOA, see Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
As to both laws, see 59 Fed. Reg. 18,268-70 (1994).
47. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269 (1994); SCHWEMM, supra note 33, at § 10.4(2).
HUD has announced that it will soon issue a regulation on the discriminatory
effect theory of proving a violation under the Fair Housing Act, which will include
addressing the issue of the defendant's burden of rebuttal in such cases. This regulation is likely to be influential in subsequent judicial decisions dealing with this
matter. See, e.g., NAACP v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300-01
(7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2335 (1993).
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reason for this policy and that there is no less discriminatory way
to achieve this business goal." Sometimes defendants have won
under this standard, but rarely. Usually, if the statistics show a
significant disproportionate impact, the plaintiff is likely to win.
The Nader report identifies six examples of lending practices
that have potentially illegal discriminatory effects.4 These include minimum loan thresholds and a high down payment requirement. A minimum loan policy was also used by the federal
Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending as an example of a policy
that might be challenged under the disparate impact theory."°
CONCLUSION

Although mortgage lending discrimination and the laws that
forbid it have been a part of the American landscape for over two
decades, it has only been in recent years that this subject has
captured the attention of the public, Congress, and federal enforcement officials. The result has been a tremendous upsurge in
interest in this field. Still, there are relatively few cases that have
been litigated to a conclusion on the merits, and fewer still that
have resulted in plaintiffs victories. Thus, we find ourselves in an
exciting period of great potential, but as yet not fully realized
accomplishment, as far as lending litigation is concerned. This
Symposium will provide one more building block for what could
well be some major breakthroughs in the enforcement of the fair
lending laws in the upcoming years.

48. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269.
49. BROWN, supra note 27, at 27.
50. 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269.

